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Determinants of European Union Enterprises Relocation in Bulgaria1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Bulgarian transition is influenced by radical events in the winter of 1997. The new 
economic policy is based on the introduction of the Currency Board and the framing 
of the reforms by the agreements with the International Monetary Fund in 1998 and 
2001. In the period 1997-2000 massive foreign investments entered the country and 
were supported by the macroeconomic stability maintained through the Currency 
Board, the beginning of the radical structural reforms and an active privatization 
policy. The EU accession perspective and the start of negotiations added a significant 
external incentive to the vital internal necessities for capital to cover the "resource 
gap" of the reform policies. 
 
FDI could be beneficial for a host economy due to the following possibilities: 
· Creates linkages between foreign affiliates and local firms. 
· Domestic competitors may increase their productivity through the working of 
‘demonstration effects’ (imitation of introduced innovations). 
· Training of local employees (managerial, marketing and technological 
knowledge could be later transferred to local firms).  
 
The article aims at identifying and measuring the determinants of the European union 
enterprises’ relocation in Bulgaria and their impact on the relations between foreign 
and local enterprises; an area, in which positive effects concerning the recipient 
country are expected. The paper consists of 3 different sections. 
 
The motives of the transnational enterprises to invest abroad are presented in the 1th 
section of the article. They are engaged with local subsidiary when the costs for 
technological and another specific transfer are lower than the export costs. The 
initiatives of the transnational companies depend to a great extent on the contract 
enforcement system. They prefer a strict following of the law – especially concerning 
intellectual property protection. On the contrary, the government of the recipient 
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country is not always interested in the contract enforcement system, searching for 
opportunities for receiving certain rent.  
 
Based on the official statistical information, as well as on info rmation from other 
sources, the 2nd part of the paper presents Current State of FDI in Bulgaria. General 
inflow patterns are presented, different practices of foreign investors’ entering into the 
country are discussed - through privatization deals as well as through the "Greenfield" 
investments. 
 
The third part of the paper contains the results of an empirical model of the 
determinants of EU based enterprises investments inflow into the manufacturing 
sectors. Results from covariance and fixed effect models (FEM) for the impact of 
different sector characteristics on the ratio of FDI and production output of respective 
manufacturing sector are presented. 
 
 
2. Factors determining the production location of a multinational company: 
review of the theories on fore ign direct investment 
 
 
In general, firms that have high quality firm-specific assets (e. g. R&D, marketing 
and management know-how, product diversification) are expected to have 
competitive edge on the international market and be willing to expand their 
production internationally. According to a number of models of multinational firms 
functioning in imperfectly competitive environment, firms with high quality firm-
specific assets (for example ‘high tech’ firms) tend to become multinational and 
choose FDI. This theory is supported by Horsmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard 
(1993), Ethier and Markusen (1996) and Markusen and Venables (1998).  
 
Norbäck (2001) suggests that the technology transfer costs were crucial factor 
influencing the decision of a multinational firm based in Sweden to shift production 
to a local affiliate. Norbäck (2001) models theoretically the decision-making 
process of a multinational firm. Initially, the multinational firm decides on its type 
of technology (level of R&D intensity), subsequently it decides on the location of 
the production process (in an affiliate in its home or host country), and finally, on 
the quantity produced and sold on the market. The firm can choose to either export 
to a host country (subject to trade costs) or choose FDI and produce in the host 
country (subject to the cost of implementing the technology there). Norbäck 
(2001)’s conclusions are that ‘high- tech’ firms tend to produce in the host country 
when the technology transfer costs are low. On the opposite, if technologies transfer 
costs are high (as is usually the case with complex technologies to be transferred 
from a more developed country to a less developed one), ‘high tech’ firms tend to 
produce at home and export abroad. Norbäck (2001) also confirms these results with 
an empirical study on Swedish manufacturing firms.  
 
Fosfuri, Motta and Ronde (2001) model a situation in which a multinational 
company can use a more advanced technology in its subsidiary in the domestic 
country, only after training a representative local worker. The authors study the 
conditions under which two types of spillovers from FDI arise: technological 
spillovers (occurring when the worker is later hired by a local firm) and pecuniary 
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spillovers (occurring when the multinational pays the trained worker a higher wage 
to prevent her/him from switching to a local competitor). They show that the 
multinational might find it optimal to export to, rather than invest in the domestic 
firm, in order to avoid both dissipating its intangible assets and payment of a higher 
wage to the trained workers. 
 
Markusen (2001) emphasizes on another factor influencing the decision of the 
multinational company, which is the contract enforcement system in the host 
country. Contract enforcement includes property rights and intellectual property 
protection (IPP), contract and bankruptcy law and other legal infrastructure. It is 
generally believed that multinationals prefer strong law contract to exist in the host 
country. On the opposite, a host country government often opposes this. IPP is seen 
by a developing country as a source of rent. The literature shows that instituting 
IPP, through its effect on the cost of imitation, leads to lower equilibrium imitation 
rates for less developed countries and lower equilibrium innovation rates in the 
more developed countries.  
 
Konrad and Lommerund (2001) suggest that in order to explore an information rent 
from producing in the host country and at the same time avoid hold-ups specific for 
the FDI, the multinational companies could set the local affiliate as joint owned 
with the local agents. The hold-ups are that the government can never perfectly infer 
the true prices concerning trade between the affiliate and the multinational. 
Therefore, the affiliate could shift its profits where taxes are lower. There is also a 
time inconsistency problem. Once investment is made and production is located in 
the host country, it is in essence sunk cost (also known as irreversible investment). 
Since the government has incomplete information, it would suspect the local 
affiliate in tax avoidance and as a countermeasure impose high taxation confiscating 
the local affiliate’s future earnings. This could lead to the multinational freezing its 
investments. Therefore, under incomplete information both the government and the 
affiliate could be worse off. A way to alleviate this problem is for the multinational 
company to sell shares or share the ownership of the local affiliate with local 
residents. This is known as ‘indigenization’ of FDI. In this case, the multinational 
company keeps the control rights of the affiliate and at the same, firstly recapture a 
part of its initial sunk investment costs, secondly, the multinational still holds its 
information advantage and enjoys an information rent, and thirdly, the government 
would not be able to impose confiscatory taxation in order not to damage the 
incomes of the local residents.  
 
Traditional international trade theories stress the importance of labor and other 
inputs’ costs, trade barriers, taxation, exchange rate dynamics etc. In determining 
the production location decision. Foreign firms might decide to become 
multinational motivated by the desire to arbitrage costs and profits of two or more 
countries. This has implications for the labor, capital and goods markets in the two 
countries. Hatzius (2000) who analyzed empirical data on FDI in the British and 
German manufacturing industries, showed that due to FDI labor costs became a 
more important factor influencing domestic investment and long run labor demand. 
 
A special case of that is a situation when foreign firms decide to become 
multinational because they are loosing their competitive edge on their own market. 
In this case, they might be willing to compensate for their low technological level 
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by importing cheap raw materials or reallocating their production (or parts of it) to a 
low cost host country.  In this case, the positive effects on development and growth 
in the host country are dubious. 
 
3. Current state of FDI in Bulgaria 
 
3.1 General inflow patterns  
 
Large-scale inflows of FDI are a relatively new phenomenon during the 
transformation process in Bulgaria. In the period 1997-2000 the total inflows of FDI 
amounted to more than 80 % of the FDI inflows  for the first ten years of transition. In 
2000 the accumulated inflows of FDI reached USD 3,929 mil within a GDP of about 
USD 12, 500 mil. The figures shown in Table 1 suggest prevailing growth trend of 
FDI inflows, which according to the preliminary data of the Bulgarian Foreign 
Investment Agency (BFIA) will not be preserved in 2001. The plunge from USD 
1,100 mil in 2000 to USD 688.5 mil could be mainly attributed to low FDI as result of 
privatization.  
 
 
Table 1 
FDI inflow in Bulgaria during transition  (in mil USD) 
 
 Privatization Capital market 
Mergers and 
acquisitions 
Greenfield+* Total for the year 
1992   34.4 34.4 
1993 22  80.4 102.4 
1994 134.2  76.7 210.9 
1995 26  136.6 162.6 
1996 76.4  180 256.4 
1997 421.4 29.7 185.1 636.2 
1998 155.8 64.2 400 620 
1999 305.7 53.1 447.3 806,1 
2000 530 20 550 1,100 
Total 1,671.5 167 2,090 3,929 
 
Source: Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency, 2001 
* Greenfield investment includes: foreign investment in new companies through own 
resources and credits of the foreign investor  
 
 
Despite the positive developments, the share of FDI in the overall investment process 
in the country - 3.3 per cent of GDP in 1998 and 6.1 per cent in 1999 (IME, 2000) has 
been far behind the level of domestic investment (15.1 per cent and 17.1 per cent for 
the same years). Facing the crucial dilemma of coping simultaneously with external 
debt payments, poverty reduction and investment within a Currency Board 
Arrangement, governments will have to maintain as high as possible interest among 
foreign investors and secure substantial flows of external capital. During the transition 
period there were 3 types of methods for the realization of FDI inflows of different 
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magnitude can be identified: privatization, stock market operations and greenfield 
investment. 
 
3.2 Privatization 
 
Given the considerable amount and state owned assets in the beginning of the 
transition process in Bulgaria, the methods and government policies of privatization 
had major impact on foreign investment. Until 2000 43% of the FDI inflows were 
realized through priva tization. 
The Bulgarian model of privatization explored  a variety of methods and techniques 
of reaching and executing privatization deals. Until this moment investors could use 
Brady bonds, from the restructured external debt, traded on the international financial 
markets and ZUNK bonds, covering accumulated "bad credits" of enterprises taken 
over by the state. In addition, the so called ‘compensatory notes’ could be used, which 
are relatively easily issued by governments to meet state obligations to individual 
losses in the nationalization or other personal misfortunes caused by the previous 
regime. Those financial instruments could cover up to 50% of the price of the assets 
under privatization. According to a KPMG survey, this opportunity has had larger 
effect on the investors’ motivation than future benefits from profit tax holiday 
(KPMG, 2000, p. 6). 
 
Another advantage achieved through privatization is that early market entrants have 
had the chance to operate in a favorable environment of indirectly subsidized 
economic activities (through energy, raw materials, softer budget constraints etc.) and 
could inherit strong market positions if the business networks are preserved but 
transformed into private ones. Such was the rather successful experience of 
companies as American Standard, ABB, Amylum, Interbrew, Solvay, Union Miniere, 
KNAUF GmbH, etc. that effectively adapted and restructured the privatized 
enterprises.  
 
Finding reliable strategic investors for the big, often debt-ridden and continuously de-
capitalized flagship companies of the "planned economy", has turned to be a serious 
challenge. Some of those enterprises had been sold for 1 Bulgarian Lev (USD 0.5) in 
exchange for debt servicing and new investment. The complexity of the problem 
resulted in fa ilures even of international consultant companies hired to act as 
intermediaries in the process like Arthur Andersen, KPMG, Price Waterhouse 
Coopers .  
 
A number of foreign investors managed to obtain bargaining power exercising 
substantial pressure on government to tailor privatization contracts to their interests. 
For example, the notorious deal with the Greek-Dutch consortium OTE/KPN for the 
sale of the telecommunications company in 1999/2000 involved demands for state 
guarantees for some elements of the financial strategy of the privatized company plus 
changes in the laws regulating the sector favoring it.  Naturally that is behavior 
afforded only by big, powerful and leading foreign investors (incl. EU based 
enterprises), and observed in countries of slow and painful transition that leaves less 
opportunities to the national governments.  
 
Another peculiarity of Bulgarian privatization has been the substantial share of 
management-employee buyouts, which are entitled to a ten year deferred payment 
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scheme with grace period. MEBOs account for 48 % of all privatization deals in the 
period 1997-2000 and aimed at compensating for the lack of investor interests. Over 
time MEBOs have been increasingly used as a cover screen for third party interests - 
political/business networks to buy cheaply. With the mounting financial difficulties of 
MEBO type companies, in an environment of lack of fresh financial resources, formal 
owners might be displaced through mergers by foreign investors.  
 
With all its contribution, the current role of privatization is phasing out. The FDI 
inflows received through privatization peaked in 1997 at USD 421 mil. In 2000, more 
than 76 per cent of the state assets marked for privatization had been already 
transferred to the private sector and the remaining 400 enterprises were expected to 
follow in 2001. In the new context FDI are expected to enter the country increasingly 
through mergers and acquisitions of local private companies, e. g. credit starved 
MEBOs.   
 
 
3.3 Greenfield investment 
 
In the category "greenfield+" FDI the BFIA includes – shares, reinvested profits, new 
credits, i.e. items from the liability side of the balance sheet of the new companies. 
Due to that definition the ‘genuine’ inflows of greenfield investment can vary 
substantially. For example in 1998 the level of FDI was  USD 620 mil according to  
BFIA but its ’genuine’ level  was only USD 401 mil according to the  World Bank  
data; accordingly the ‘genuine’ greenfield FDI inflows amounted to only  about USD 
180 mil instead of  USD 400 mil as indicated in Table 1.  
 
Greenfield FDI is an important indicator for specific interests and motivation of 
foreign investors to do business in Bulgaria. Greenfield FDI are predominantly 
invested in small and medium enterprise (SME) although in the last couple of years 
large affiliates have appeared as well - the German chain METRO (still the biggest 
single investment), Liebhher (Germany), Astro BILLA (Austria), Ideal Standard 
(USA), etc. Foreign investment presence in the SME sector seems especially 
widespread in textiles and clothing, shoes, wood processing, etc. Transition has been 
difficult for local SMEs but not necessarily foreign ones. While the local companies 
have been locked in a largely unfriendly banking system, the foreign companies have 
a wider access to the more favorable financial markets.  
 
3.4 Ownership structure  
 
In the shaping of the ownership structures of the companies there is a definite drive 
among foreign investors to achieve full ownership (100 percent) over the new 
companies. A survey reveals that 2/3of the investors own more than 90 per cent of the 
shares of their companies. The case studies, additional interviews and documentation 
provide strong additional evidence for that tendency. The strategy followed by foreign 
investors of establishing effective control over the management of the companies they 
invest in might be due to their disbelief in the country’s legal system, capital markets, 
and the system of corporate governance.  
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Table 2  
FDI in Bulgaria by countries and years 1992 - 2000 
 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total by 
countries 
In million 
USD 
 Total by 
years 
34.42 102.37 210.86 162.63 256.36 636.96 619.96 806.10 
(818.8) 
1100.0 
(1001.5) 
3928.9 
            
1 Germany 0.11 56.63 111.43 16.16 53.1 31.44 55.7 101.30 72.30 498.2 
2 Belgium 0 0.14 0.3 10.02 0.79 264.39 31.22 66.22 39.80 412.9 
3 Italy 0.01 0.22 5.17 2.27 1.19 0.42 2.06 23.02 339.70 374.1 
4 Greece 0.16 5.08 2.97 29.79 14.55 16.1 3.33 14.91 241.1 328.0 
5 Cyprus 0.33 1.19 0.39 1.4 7.51 20.55 109.09 108.91 -11.30 238.1 
6 USA 0 10.49 16.15 16.1 20.66 46.61 38.6 49.80 37.1 235.5 
7 Austria 13.03 1.02 14.66 1.39 12.07 12.46 46.91 23.39 88.8 213.7 
8 Russia 0.31 1.35 2.27 15.05 14.37 2.01 14.84 103.74 50.8 204.7 
9 Netherlands 0.07 0.52 37.94 0.85 46.27 10.8 41.28 27.96 17.4 183.1 
10 UK 6.21 5.55 2.43 13.74 7.26 15.83 58.85 48 22.6 180.5 
11 Turkey 0 9.84 1.26 13.74 7.26 9.87 23.76 39.39 19.5 124.5 
12 France 0 0.22 4.19 4.99 6.51 0.82 3.35 62.72 28.9 111.7 
13 Spain 0.04 0 .06 0.01 0 0 49.55 56.8 3.21 0.7 110.4 
14 Switzerland 0.38 6.69 0.24 7.87 23.08 31.36 6.58 13.13 15.08 104.3 
15 Korea 0 0 0.26 0.2 22.31 22.9 1.78 2.81 6.6 56.9 
16 Bahamas 0 0 0 0 0 0 22.76 10.36 14.22 47.3 
17 Luxembour
g 
0 0.58 0.58 0.36 0.23 11.75 22.71 3.81 0 40.4 
18 Ireland 0 0 0.02 17.4 0.18 5.21 0.97 3.72 1 28.8 
19 Hungary 12.26 0.05 0 0 0.07 0 0.68 0.53 
(1.7) 
2 16.7 
20 Israel 0 0.03 0.93 0.02 1.45 0.01 0.03 13.84 0 (1.9) 10.0 
21 Czech 0 0 0.05 2.34 2.28 4.68 0.58 0.09 0 10.0 
22 Malta 0 0 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.09 8.9 0 0.5 9.7 
23 Liechtenste
in 
0 1.11 0.13 0.01 0 2.53 0.79 1.28 3 8.9 
24 Sweden 0 0 0.01 0.03 1.42 2.36 0.94 1.57 0.3 6.6 
25 Japan 0.01 0 0.08 0.5 0.6 1.9 1.89 0 1.3 6.3 
26 Denmark 0 0 1.07 0.02 0 1.12 1.58 0.33 1.3 5.4 
Source: Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency, March 2001 
 
3.5 Origin of capital 
 
Concerning the origin of FDI in Bulgaria for the period 1992-2000, Germany has 
been the unchallenged leader, followed by Belgium, Italy and Greece.  However, 
ranking fluctuates over the years  since any of the big privatization deals tends to  lead 
to a significant rearrangement. For example until 1999 Italy contributed only 
modestly to the FDI inflows. In 2000 though Bulbank, the largest Bulgarian bank was 
privatized and bought by Unicredito Italiano and consequently Italian FDI from 15-th 
position jumped to 3-rd. Similarly  Greek FDI moved from twelve to fourth position.  
 
FDI inflows are heavily concentrated in terms of origin: in both 2000 and 1999 the 
first 10 countries contributed to 73% of accumulated FDI inflows. At the same time 
until 2000 the share of investment originating from  the EU  comprised 63% of total 
FDI compared to 56% in the previous year.  Disaggregating these figures at company 
level,  91 of the  largest 152 investors were EU companies.  
 
The relatively significant level of investments from countries that are off-shore 
territories (also known as tax havens), as Cyprus, Bahamas, Malta suggest intentions 
of the international capital  to test the business conditions in an  emerging market such 
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as Bulgaria and define their strategies for the future. In today’s globalized world 
origins are deceiving. 
 
3.6 Allocation of FDI by economic sectors  
 
The sectors distribution of FDI over the years has been changing dynamically again 
with every big privatization deal reshaping the allocation pattern.  
The sectors trade and transport have been most attractive for FDI in the period 1992-
1994. Starting from 1995 investments in industry registered relatively steady growth 
and by the end of 1999 foreign investment in industry reached USD 1556.53 mil or 
nearly 55% of the total (Table 3). Trade attracted USD 542.96 (19.2%); finance – 
USD 324.04 mil (11.4%), tourism – USD 142.83 (5%). The sale of Bulbank in 2000 
has already pushed the share of finance to USD 597 mil and the sector has been 
almost completely privatized by foreign banks with EU capitals holding about 70 per 
cent of it. The entering of more serious FDI into the Bulgarian economy is connected 
with the increase of interest of the foreign investors in the industrial sectors – after 
1995 the share of investments in the industry is settled at a level around 60%. Far 
more insignificant are the shares of the considered perspective sectors, tourism and 
transport, and the share of investments in the financial sector vary at level around 
15%. Entering of some major foreign trade chains since 1998 keeps the share of the 
trade at a considerably higher level (around 20%). So far the seemingly most 
unattractive sectors have been telecommunications and agriculture. The expected sale 
of the Bulgarian Telecommunication Company (BTC) in 2001 can lift the sector to 
the second position but investment in agriculture most probably will develop at a slow 
pace due to the actual ban on land purchase by foreign persons.  
 
Table 3   
FDI by sectors and by years 1992- 1999, in mil USD  
 
 Sectors/ 
Years 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total by 
sectors 
1 Industry 0.16 20.82 28.2 94.53 172.48 458.46 310.64 471.24 1,556.53 
2 Trade 13.5 70 59.89 20.06 32.37 45.72 177.37 124.05 542.96 
3 Finance 0 1.85 18.82 32.34 15.4 64.34 72.23 119.06 324.04 
4 Tourism 0.55 0.86 43.31 10.22 23.31 5.7 18.37 40.51 142.83 
5 Transport  12.76 2.06 55.21 1.2 4.78 3.11 6.22 -11.73 73.61 
6 Telecommu
nications 
6.08 3.97 0 0 0.9 3.58 23.23 14.13 51.89 
7 Construction 0.17 0.31 4.77 1.11 1.11 6.19 6.34 6.47 26.47 
8 Agriculture 0 0 0 0.06 1.38 4.63 0.06 2.36 8.49 
9 Others 1.2 2.5 0.65 3.11 4.62 44.44 5.52 40.01 102.05 
 Total by 
years 
34.42 102.37 210.85 162.63 256.35 636.17 619.98 806.10 2,828.87 
Source: BFIA, March 2000. 
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4. DETERMINANTS OF THE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN 
BULGARIA: CHARACTERISTIC AND MODELS OF THE IMPACT 
In this section an attempt is made to statistically analyze the available empirical data 
in order to find the determinants and their impact on the decision to commit to FDI 
(incl. FDI from the EU based companies) in Bulgaria. When a multinational company 
considers relocating its production to a country, it is concerned with the general 
political and macro-economic environment in the country, but more importantly the 
production and market conditions in the specific industry they plan to place their 
affiliate. A specific external factor or policy decision affects various industries 
differently, which compels analyzing the FDI data disaggregated by industry. The 
analysis was accompanied by the usual for a country in transition data availability 
constraints, such as short series of comparable2 data and lack of systematic data 
expressing the quantity and dynamics of certain qualitative factors. In addition, 
disaggregated statistical data on many economic indicators are available only for the 
industrial sectors. Considering the complexity of the task, we undertake an impact 
analysis of the factors in the industrial sectors.   
4.1 The  Branch Determinants of FDI 
The factors whose influence on industrial FDI we study here are those directly related 
to ensure a foreign investor’s comparative advantage on the territory of the host 
country. According to the international economics theory, if a country offers lower 
production costs and more market opportunities, cetiris paribus, allows for higher 
profitability and draws higher foreign investments.  
A set of specific economic characteristics of industrial sectors could be identified as 
major determinants for FDI inflow. 
1) The export orientation of the sector: The export orientation of the sector is 
measured through the ratio between export and total production of the sector. In 
some typical cases FDI are theoretically considered to utilize the export 
potential advantages of the host country and sell the products in the home 
country or third countries markets (Chunlai, 1997, p.20). 
2) The import substitution of the sector: The import dependency of the sector is 
measured through the ratio between the import of an industry’s final product 
and the total production of the sector. It is assumed that the establishment of an 
enterprise, producing analogue production in the country, would realize certain 
comparative advantages displacing  the imported production. In other cases, 
MNCs tend to support imports of finished goods from the parent company when 
elements of complementarity as well as substitutability among imports and FDI 
could be identified The higher the import dependency, the higher is expected to 
be investment in the industry. (Anastassopoulos, 2000, p.120). 
3) The labor intensity of production in the industry, measured as the share of the 
labor costs in the structure of the production costs, is identified as an undoubted 
                                                 
2 The data series before and after 1990, are not comparable since only during the 
second period international standards for statistical data collection were introduced.   
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stimulating factor for foreign investors to relocate their production. The idea is 
that the more labor and resource intensive and the less equipment intensive a 
production is, the less technology transfer costs will be incurred by the 
multinational company in relocation. At the same time the more labor intensive 
a production is, the more attractive for FDI will be lower average wages of full 
time employees in the sector. 
4) The material intensity of the production in the sector is measured through the 
share of the costs for raw materials, materials and energy in the structure of the 
production costs of the sector. The access to considerably cheaper local sources 
of raw materials, as well as cheap energy for production needs is expected also 
to be a serious incentive for reallocation of production powers. 
The intensity of use of the production equipment could be measured through many 
alternative ways. Here compelled by the data availability, we use as such indicator the 
amortization costs in the structure of the production costs. The growth of production 
in the given sector is measured through the indexes of the physical volume of the 
production toward chosen basic year (1995). It is assumed that these indexes are 
indicators for the perspectives for eventual favorable development of the branch. 
The Bulgarian Foreign Investments Agency provides the distribution of FDI in 
Bulgarian manufacturing sectors and branches for a four-year period since 1998 up to 
2001. Limited ranges of these sectors characteristics are obtained from the official 
industrial statistics for the same period and the same set of sectors3. 
Description of variables 
Disaggregated statistical data for the relevant sectors characteristics are available only 
for manufacturing sectors, which limits the options for using wider range of existing 
FDI data for econometric modeling. The following set of sectors are used in the study: 
                                                 
3 Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency provides official FDI data on its website: www.bfia.org. The 
data for manufacturing sectors is obtained by Statistical Yearbooks and Statistical Reference Books for 
the period 1998-2001, which are official publications of National Statistical Institute of Republic of 
Bulgaria (the data for year 2001 are preliminary). 
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1.  Food products and tobacco 
2.  Textile and clothing 
3.  Leather and leather products 
4.  Wood products 
5.  Publishing 
6.  Petroleum, rubber, plastic and other chemical products 
7.  Mineral products (cement, glass, etc.) 
8.  Metallurgy 
9.  Mechanical products 
10.  Electronics, computers and communication equipment 
11.  Vehicles and other transport equipment 
The variables necessary for the empirical models are as follows: 
FDI Foreign direct investments (million $) 
OUTPUT Annual output of manufacturing sector (million $) 
EXPORT Annual export of the sector (million $) 
IMPORT Annual import of the sector (million $) 
RATEFDI Ratio of FDI and output of the sector (rate) 
RATEEXP Ratio between export and production of the sector (rate) 
RATEIMP Ratio between import and production of the sector (rate) 
LABSHARE Share of labor costs in total production costs (rate) 
MATSHARE Share of materials and energy costs in total production costs (rate) 
 
In this article  we assume that higher rates of export (import) to total production will 
reflect higher export potential (import dependency) of the sector. It is expected that 
the variation of these indicators would attract FDI in a systematic pattern. The  
expected sign of RATEEXP is positive while both directions for RATEIMP are 
acceptable reflecting different goals targeted by FDI inflow. High shares of inputs are 
expected to stimulate foreign investment in the sector since the prices of these 
resources are still relatively low with sufficient quality provided. 
 
4.2 Empirical models 
 
Having in mind the data limitations problems we adopt in this study a simplified 
approach for building and estimation some empirical models of FDI determinants in 
order to assess their impact on investments allocation in manufacturing sectors. Since 
the data consists of time series of cross-sections (a panel type of data) the study 
employed first a covariance model accounting for sector-specific and time effects: 
it
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where two sets of dummy variables are introduced (Pyndick, Rubinfeld, 1991, p.225): 
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1Sit =  , for i-th sector (i = 2, …, N=11);   0, otherwise; 
1M it =  , for t-th year (t = 2, …, T=4);   0, otherwise. 
In this model the dummy variables coefficients should measure the change in the 
intercepts from sector to sector and from year to year with respect to the first sector in 
first year (the absence of ?11 and d11 is compensated by the constant intercept a). 
Pyndick and Rubinfeld (1991, p.226) suggest as well testing the significance of the 
introduction of these two types of dummy variables based on F criterion. The choice 
of the unrestricted (covariance) over restricted (all ?it=dit=0) model would be justified 
if the expected decrease in the residual sums of squares, provided by the covariance 
model, is significantly larger then the RSS of this model. Otherwise the restrictions 
are justified and OLS estimation method could be used over the pooled cross-section 
and time series data. 
Another type of regression analysis using panel data, namely the fixed effects model, 
was also involved in the study4. This approach assumes the existence of an individual 
effect for each sector; the model is of the following type: 
it
K
1j
jitjiit XY e+b+a= å
=
 
where ai is considered as constant over time and specific to the particular cross-
sectional unit (the i-th sector). After introduction of a series of 10 dummy variables, 
the OLS method was used to provide estimates of all N+K coefficients of this model. 
 
4.2 Results of models estimation 
A block-wise procedure was conducted in order to estimate the parameters of 
different models. The dependent variable is RATFDI and the vector of K=5 
independent variables X consists of RATEEXP, RATEIMP, LABSHARE, 
MATSHARE and OUTPUT. The latter is expected to capture possible size effects 
originating from the manufacturing sector scale. The main results from the covariance 
model are presented in Table 4. 
1) The introduction of dummy variables accounting for time effects does not improve 
significantly either the pooled or the unrestricted only for sector effects model (the F-
test for the change in RSS for both models does not give positive results at the usual 
significance levels). Unlike this, the involvement of sector dummies could be 
considered, in some extend, to have some reliable improvement effect on the overall 
                                                 
4 W. Greene (2000, p.559-560) points out that a fundamental advantage of a panel data set over a cross-
section is that it allows greater flexibility to the researcher in modeling behavioral differences across 
individuals. The choice between fixed (FEM) and random (REM) effects model should be subject to 
statistical testing, but an important remarks could be taken into account. First, the FEM “… might be 
viewed as applying only to the cross-sectional units in the study, not to additional ones outside the 
sample” (Greene, 2000, p.567). This view would not be appropriate if the sampled cross-sectional units 
were drawn from a large population, but this is not the case we have here. The adopted set of manufac-
turing sectors can in no way be treated as a random sample since they cover almost the entire classify-
cation range, and are selected on the basis of available statistical data for FDI inflows. Besides, “… the 
fixed effects approach has one considerable virtue. There is no justification for treating the individual 
effects as uncorrelated with the other regressors, as is assumed in the REM…” (Greene, 2000, p.576). 
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performance of the model. The test for significant change in RSS is in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis at quite high level (Sig<0.104) but for the purposes of this 
study we find it acceptable. The model that would be most appropriate for the analysis 
should account only for sector-specific effects captured by the dummy variables Si. 
2) LABSHARE variable demonstrated acceptable significance in all four models; 
analogue result was obtained for MATSHARE although just by the first two models. 
This can be outlined as a confirmation of the initial hypothesis for FDI orientation to 
resource- intensive industries, for both labor and material resources.  
3) The estimate of RATEEXP coefficient was not obtained significant at the usual 
level but Model 2 provides an acceptable Type I error risk (Sig.<0,105) accounting 
for the importance of this variable. The impact  of the export potential of 
manufacturing sectors could be found (in some extent) valid.It should be noted here 
that the volatility of FDI inflow in some  sectors is quite high and subjected to shock-
like changes. For example, the large investment in oil processing branch in 1999 (the 
takeover of Neftochim Bourgas Plc. by Lukoil Corp.) contrasts significantly with the 
data for the other years whilst the economic indicators of this branch remained quite 
stable during the period, especially the export potential of the chemical branch which 
is considered as quite high. 
4) The insignificant results for RATEIMP escorted by changes in the coefficient sign 
gave evidence for the lack of substantial net relation between the import ratio and FDI 
inflow relative to the level of output. The contradictory behavior of this variable 
supports underline that there are not an empirical prove for clear theoretical insight 
about the import-FDI relation. 
5) There is no scale effect on the FDI inflow distribution since the OUTPUT 
coefficient is insignificant both in the second and third model where sector-specific 
effects were accounted for. If formally the pooled data model has to be preferred, the 
size effect appears as significant. This signals for a potential existence of an 
interrelation between the sector’s scale and FDI inflow where causality could be valid 
in both directions. 
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Table 4.  
Empirical results from the covariance model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. 
(Constant) -0,6894 0,0400 -1,1407 0,0770 -0,9014 0,2552 -0,8129 0,0609 
RATEEXP 0,0137 0,6976 0,1773 0,1045 0,1536 0,2613 0,0015 0,9721 
RATEIMP -0,0095 0,3847 0,0246 0,1597 0,0310 0,0848 -0,0114 0,3397 
MATSHARE 1,0977 0,0110 1,4253 0,0506 1,1806 0,1747 1,1218 0,1132 
LABSHARE 0,8809 0,0814 1,7234 0,0234 2,6275 0,0758 1,2280 0,0206 
OUTPUT -0,0001 0,0011 -0,0001 0,6824 -0,0001 0,3576 -0,0001 0,0016 
S2   -0,2591 0,3157 -0,6139 0,0708   
S3   -0,3312 0,2921 -0,6637 0,0819   
S4   0,0369 0,8826 -0,1467 0,5896   
S5   0,0346 0,8815 -0,1731 0,5036   
S6   -0,0554 0,5007 -0,0657 0,4217   
S7   0,1007 0,6405 -0,0985 0,6863   
S8   -0,1259 0,3354 -0,1792 0,2020   
S9   -0,1308 0,5318 -0,4268 0,1287   
S10   -0,1370 0,5364 -0,3940 0,1517   
S11   -0,1838 0,4772 -0,5346 0,1123   
T99     -0,0864 0,0899 -0,0110 0,7784 
T00     -0,0117 0,7829 0,0290 0,4758 
T01     -0,0217 0,7328 0,0147 0,7677 
         
RSS 0,2866  0,1737  0,1509  0,2788  
D.f. for RSS 38  28  25  35  
Sig.F 0,016  0,017  0,024  0,072  
R Square 0,297  0,574  0,630  0,317  
Adj. R sq. 0,205  0,346  0,363  0,160  
 
Analogous block-wise procedure was conducted for FEM parameter estimation. The 
dependent variable is the same (RATFDI) and two sets of regressors were used: the 
first set involved the same five variables from the covariance model, but in the second 
one the scale controlling variable (OUTPUT) was dropped in order to search for any 
significant changes in the results. The latter are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Empirical results from FEM 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. 
RATEEXP 0.0166 0.6516 0.1773 0.1045 0.0118 0.7666 0.1734 0.1054 
RATEIMP -0.0161 0.1444 0.0246 0.1597 -0.0131 0.2663 0.0258 0.1287 
MATSHARE -0.0608 0.7877 1.7234 0.0234 0.1098 0.6406 1.7600 0.0182 
LABSHARE 0.2378 0.0030 1.4253 0.0506 0.0840 0.1391 1.4252 0.0472 
OUTPUT -0.0001 0.0079 -0.0001 0.6824     
S1   -1.1407 0.0770   -1.2491 0.0322 
S2   -1.3998 0.0205   -1.4403 0.0144 
S3   -1.4718 0.0199   -1.4825 0.0173 
S4   -1.1038 0.0592   -1.1152 0.0529 
S5   -1.1061 0.0309   -1.1305 0.0244 
S6   -1.1960 0.0797   -1.3224 0.0286 
S7   -1.0399 0.0591   -1.0668 0.0481 
S8   -1.2666 0.0471   -1.3337 0.0287 
S9   -1.2715 0.0289   -1.3138 0.0202 
S10   -1.2777 0.0301   -1.3058 0.0237 
S11   -1.3245 0.0207   -1.3473 0.0166 
         
RSS 0,3207  0,1737  0,3852  0,1748  
D.f. for RSS 39  28  40  29  
Sig.F 0,0001  0,0004  0,0013  0,0002  
R Square 0,463  0,709  0,355  0,707  
Adj. R sq. 0,394  0,543  0,291  0,556  
 
1) All 11 dummy variables introduced both in Model 2 and 4 proved to be statistically 
significant which showed the existence of fixed sector-specific effects. The 
involvement of these dummies provided also significant improvement of the 
explanatory power of these models. We thus conclude that FEM results (by Model 2) 
should be preferred for the analysis since its adjusted coefficient of determination 
(54,3%) is much higher than those of the covariance model (34,6%). 
2) It is obvious however that the main results obtained by the Covariance Model 2 are 
confirmed by FEM 2 concerning the effects of resource intensity and export 
orientation; the insignificance of import substitution impact and the contradictory 
changes in the sign of its coefficient took place as well. 
3) The previously obtained result for the scale factor insignificance, when accounting 
for fixed effects, was also confirmed by FEM. If the pooled data model is estimated 
(without constant term), however, the size effect appears again as significant. 
Because of the significant volatility of the dynamics of the FDI in manufacturing 
sectors, relatively low levels for the adjusted coefficients of determinations were 
obtained. These unsatisfactory characteristics could be due to formally technical 
reasons (short data series and respectively small numbers for the degrees of freedom) 
or, in some extent, to model misspecification problems. It should be noted however 
that omitted variables problem is very likely to have been realized due to the lack of 
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highly relevant regressors. In this line, a more elaborated study is necessary to 
incorporate data on larger set of economic indicators for a wider range of economic 
sectors, including finance and insurance, trade, transport, etc. 
5. Main Conclusions. 
At the end of the 90s an increase of the total volume as well as increase of the average 
level of a unit of foreign investment (and especially of EU based international 
companies) was observed. The FDI inflows are directed mainly towards industry, 
financial sector and to some extent the trade. As main stimulating macroeconomic 
factors can be identified: 
· Macro-economic and financial stabilization – low inflation rates and fixed rate 
of the national currency to the Euro; 
· Acceleration of the privatization process and the increase of private sector share 
in Bulgarian economy; 
· Opening new sectors to foreign investors; 
· Harmonization of Bulgarian tax system to international standards, as well as 
improving the tax administration operations. 
Typical for the FDI in manufacturing sectors is the resource-seeking motivation 
irrespective of the sector size. These results give a justification for the initial 
hypothesis that resource-intensity determinants influence the European union 
enterprises relocation and the foreign investment decision-making. Accounting for the 
limitations of this study we conclude that the territorial closeness and other location 
advantages concerning material resource inputs proved to be of significant matter 
about EU-based FDI inflow. 
The hypothesis for the export-platform orientation of European investments was 
confirmed at an acceptable level of significance. The export potential of different 
manufacturing sectors has a stimulating impact on EU investors’ interest in Bulgarian 
industry. Further analysis however is necessary in order to reveal a possible bi-
directional character of FDI-export relation. 
The expected correlation  between EU investments and import substitution  did not 
prove to be valid according to the empirical results obtained from the available data 
for the period 1998-2001. In some cases high FDI inflow could be considered as 
supporting sales of imported finished goods but it contrasts with other sectors where 
the import-output ratio is relatively low. In other cases low relative levels of  FDI are 
associated with high imports ratio. 
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